The traditional theories of judicial decision-making have their differences set around the importance of logical, rule-bound, and step-by-step reasoning. For legal formalists, relying on empirical research on decision-making, we argue that logical and rule-bound judicial decision-making, although possible in theory, is highly unlikely in practice. Second, by relying on indirect empirical evidence, we show that judges are very likely to possess unexceptional decision-making skills even when it comes to aspects of decision-making that have not been specifically tested on judges.
INTRODUCTION
What is the role of rule-based, logical, step-by-step thinking in judicial decision-making? This question has been at the center of many jurisprudential debates for almost a century now. Before the rise of Legal Realism, the prevailing view was that judicial decision-making consists of the logical application of legal rules to the facts of the case. For many contemporary legal formalists, judicial decision-making is still best epitomized by logical, rule-based thinking. 1 In the 1920s, the legal realists challenged this view. 2 Max Radin, for example, argued that judges do not process information logically but make instant and intuitive decisions in response to clusters of fact situations (the so-called situation type of judging). 3 Hutcheson, a federal judge, also famously argued that judges use "hunches" or intuitive decision-making first, and only then use logical thinking to come up with justifications for their preferred outcome. 4 Thus, according to the legal realist model, judicial decision-making is an intuitive process, where step-bystep rule-bound reasoning is secondary.
Legal Realism, as a self-identified movement, faded away after a few decades and its place was later taken by other jurisprudential schools, such as Critical Legal
Studies or economic analysis of law. However, the question remained controversial whether judicial decision-making is primarily a logical and rule-bound thinking process.
In the last few decades, general empirical research on decision-making has blossomed. Some of the empirical research has also been carried out on judges.
Accordingly, the purpose of this article is twofold. First, by synthesizing empirical 1 Judge Posner thus describes the formalistic ideal: "The ideal legalist decision is the product of a syllogism in which a rule of law supplies the major premise, the facts of the case supply the minor one, and the decision is the conclusion. The rule might have to be extracted from a statute or a constitutional provision, but the legalist model comes complete with a set of rules of interpretation (the "canons of construction"), so that interpretation too becomes a rule-bound activity, purging judicial discretion" (Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 41). 2 There is more to legal realism than just an idea that judicial decision-making is not the rule-bound but rather the intuitive process. Overall, the legal realists had two general theses. First, judges have a preferred outcome of the case even before they turn to legal rules; that preferred outcome is usually based on some non-legalistic grounds, like conceptions of justice, attributes of litigating parties (government, poor plaintiff, racial group, etc), ideology, public policy preferences, judge's personality, etc. Second, judges usually will find a justification in formal legal rules for their preferred outcome; this is possible because the legal system is complex and often contradictory (see generally evidence, we show that logical and step-by-step decision-making, although possible in theory, is highly unlikely in real-world judicial decision-making. Second, by relying on indirect empirical evidence, we argue that even when it comes to areas of decision-making that have not been specifically tested on judges, distinctive expert judgment is highly unlikely and thus judges are very likely to possess unexceptional decision-making skills.
RULE-BASED THINKING VS. INTUITIVE THINKING

INTRODUCTION TO DUAL-SYSTEM THEORIES
One of the most significant findings to emerge from contemporary empirical research is that there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning and decision-making. 5 First, there is an evolutionarily old system that is automatic, unconscious, fast, associative, and parallel. Second, there is a more recent system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow.
Perhaps the most influential dual-process theory is the System1/System2 distinction. 6 The following table summarizes the main differences between the two systems:
7 5 The idea that there are two different models of reasoning and decision-making is old. Descartes distinguished between intuition and deduction. Pascal distinguished between "intuitive" mind and "geometric" mind (Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Kahneman points out, most of the time these systems work together rather well. 8 System 1 is very efficient -it requires little effort to perform at its peak. In general, System 1 is very good at its core functions; its initial reactions are usually very swift. Yet, System 1 is prone to cognitive biases -systematic decision-making errors. For example, it tends to answer easier questions than the ones it is really asked; it has almost no understanding of logic, statistics, and other probabilistic reasoning skills. Moreover, System 1 cannot be turned off; however, it can be overridden by System 2, but as the next section shows, System 2 is rarely eager to do that.
According to formalistic ideals, judicial decision-making is a pure product of the rule-based, controlled, and slow thinking processes -System 2. Yet, as the following sections show, such an ideal is a mirage.
EFFORTFUL THINKING AND MONITORING OF INTUITIVE ERRORS
Ideally, System 2 would always correct and override System 1's mistakes:
"System 1 quickly proposes intuitive answers to judgment problems as they arise, and System 2 monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may endorse, correct, or override. The judgments that are eventually expressed are called 8 Regarding the first question, the intuitive answer is ten cents, but since the bat costs one dollar more, that means that both would cost $1.20, so the correct answer is five cents. Regarding the second question, the correct answer is five minutes; third question: forty-seven days. Although one can answer all of these questions correctly with some reflection, most people answer correctly on average 1.24 of the 3 questions. 12 As Kahneman observes, "many people are overconfident, prone to place too much faith in their intuitions. They apparently find cognitive effort at least mildly unpleasant and avoid it as much as possible." 13 Although the CRT seems simple on its face, it is a very precise indicator of susceptibility to cognitive errors. A recent study found that the CRT predicts performance on a wide sample of tasks from the heuristics-and-biases better than measures of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and executive functioning. Overall, if the CRT is the best predictor of ability to resist the first (and erroneous) response, and judges fare no better than average experimental subjects, it is reasonable to conclude that judges are prone to cognitive errors in the same way that ordinary experimental subjects are.
DECISION FATIGUE
Meanwhile, declining from the noon of day,
The sun obliquely shoots his burning ray;
The hungry judges soon the sentence sign,
And wretches hang that jury-men may dine; Alexander Pope -The Rape of the Lock: Canto 3
Not only System 2 is lazy in its oversight of intuitive judgments proposed by System 1, it is also easily fatigued. A classic caricature of legal realism has been the trope that justice is "what the judge ate for breakfast." One recent study tested whether there is some scientific basis for this trope. The results are such that if formalists had predicted them, they would have never used such a caricature.
The study data consisted of 1,112 judicial rulings of the Israeli parole board collected over a ten month period. 17 The study found that "the likelihood of a ruling in favor of a prisoner spikes at the beginning of each session-the probability of a favorable ruling steadily declines from ≈0.65 to nearly zero and jumps back up to 15 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, supra note 5: 14-15. 16 Ibid.: 16; Shane Frederick, supra note 11: 27-28. 17 Shai Danzigera, Jonathan Levav, and Liora Avnaim-Pessoa, "Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions,"
Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences (USA) 108 (2011).
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≈0.65 after a break for a meal." 18 In other words, a prisoner is 650% more likely to get a favorable parole decision if his case is heard right after the break than the last in the series before an upcoming break. (The study of course carefully tested for other possible explanations).
The findings of the study, although disquieting, build on numerous previous studies showing that repeated judgments or decisions deplete individuals' executive function and mental resources. 19 The mental depletion increases the tendency to simplify decisions and accept the status quo. 20 Thus, for parole judges the status quo is not to grant a parole. Food breaks, however, restore glucose supply to the brain and enable individuals to make effortful decisions. The authors of the study thus summarized their main findings:
We have presented evidence suggesting that when judges make repeated rulings, they show an increased tendency to rule in favor of the status quo. This 
INTUITIVE AND EXPERIENTIAL DECISION-MAKING
As the previous sections have shown, while rule-based, analytical, rational, step-by-step decision making is possible in theory, in practice it is limited when it comes to both ordinary subjects and professional judges. It also means that judges make their usual decisions predominantly using System 1, which is intuitive and experiential, not rule-based or logical. Intuitive thinking, however, does not mean that a judge is flying blind at the decision. An intuitive mind is often superior -the unconscious mind has greater capacity than the conscious mind and so has access 18 20 Ibid. This phenomenon is also called ego-depletion. 21 Shai Danzigera, Jonathan Levav, and Liora Avnaim-Pessoa, supra note 17: 6992.
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to vast knowledge; conscious, step-by-step reasoning may be inferior even when the time is not pressing. 22 The quality of intuitive thinking, however, depends on many factors, including education, upbringing, the beliefs of peers, personality, and so on. 23 Yet, as
Kahneman points out, whether intuitive thinking will produce consistently sound judgments depends mostly on environment, available feedback, and prolonged practice:
The acquisition of skills requires a regular environment, an adequate opportunity to practice, and rapid and unequivocal feedback about the correctness of thoughts and actions. When these conditions are fulfilled, skill eventually develops, and the intuitive judgments and choices that quickly come to mind will mostly be accurate. All this is the work of System 1, which means it occurs automatically and fast. 24 Reliance on System 1 means that judges, like all people, are susceptible to cognitive biases. System 1 relies on heuristics -rules of thumb for decisionmaking. Heuristics make perfect sense in evolutionary perspective, even though they also predispose us to sub-optimal decisions in contemporary environment.
Thus, heuristics also lead to cognitive biases. An example of heuristic and resultant cognitive bias is loss aversion: losses loom much larger than gains; in other words, emotional intensity of losing $100 will be compensated only by a gain of $200. For a rational economic agent, homo economicus, such decision-making rules seem obviously irrational.
Another example is the anchor-and-adjust heuristic; anchoring effect is the unconscious reliance on the first available information to make a decision even if the first available information is random. 25 For example, one study tested the anchoring effect on experienced German judges, who had on average more than 15 22 Timothy D. Wilson and Jonathan W. Schooler, "Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 60 (1991). As Posner also observes, Hutcheson's equating intuition to "hunch" was a mistake -"a hunch sounds like a guess, a shot in the dark" (Richard A. Posner, supra note 1, p. 113). 23 Ibid., p. 98 24 Daniel Kahneman, supra note 8, p. 416 25 In the classical experiment by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman participants had to guess the percentage of African nations that were members of the United Nations. Some people were asked whether it was more or less than 10%; others were asked whether it was more or less than 65%. The question that participants heard served as the anchor -an initial and unconscious suggestion from which participants would adjust their answer. Thus, the participants who were asked whether it was more or less than 10% answered on average 25%; the participants who were asked whether it was more or less than 65% answered on average 45% (Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," Science 185 (1974)). In a relatively more recent experiment, the researchers asked participants to guess how old Gandhi was when he died. Some people were asked whether Gandhi died before or after age of 140; although the question was obviously off the mark with his possibly real age when he died, this group was still influenced by the question -they answered on average that Gandhi died when he was 67 years old. Others were asked whether he died before or after age of 9; the estimates of this group were on average lower 17 years, i.e. that Gandhi died when he was 50 years (Fritz Strak and Thomas Mussweiler, "Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect: Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73 (1997)).
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years of judicial experience. The judges read a description of a woman on trial for shoplifting. The judges were asked to roll a pair of dice before indicating the exact prison sentence they would impose on the woman. The dice, however, were loaded to result in either 3 or 9. Obviously, the rolling of the dice is unrelated to sentencing, so judges should have not been influenced by it. And yet, the judges who rolled 3 sentenced the woman on average to 5 months and the judges who rolled 9 sentenced her on average to 8 months. 26 There are dozens of other ways that System 1 can go astray. And it would be beyond the scope of the present work to mention all the cognitive biases that judges may be susceptible to. Suffice it to mention that empirical studies have found little or no difference between judges and ordinary subjects in heuristic decision-making and attendant cognitive biases. 27 Thus, judges, like other people, are prone not only to anchoring bias, 28 but also representativeness heuristic (neglecting statistic base rate), 29 hindsight bias (overestimating predictability of past events) and many others.
System 1 is not only susceptible to cognitive biases, but it also has little understanding of formal logic. For example, most college students consider this syllogism valid: 30 All roses are flowers.
Some flowers fade quickly.
Therefore some roses fade quickly.
But this syllogism is flawed -it commits the fallacy of unequal distribution.
Likewise, System 1 is prone to make snap judgments and jump to conclusions even when only incomplete information is available.
31
System 1 also tends to substitute easier questions for more difficult ones:
whenever it faces the target question that is difficult, it will be prone to answer a heuristic question -the simpler question related to the target question. 32 32 For example, the target question -"How popular will the president be six months from now?" -is difficult to answer because it requires computation of myriad of factors, including many factors which are compounded by uncertainty; therefore, System 1 will likely substitute the target question with the heuristic question -"How popular is the president right now?" (ibid., p. 116).
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of methods to reduce decision-making effort. 33 An experimental example of attribute substitution comes from studies on contingent valuation. In one study, three groups of subjects were asked how much they would pay to save 2,000 birds, or 20,000 birds, or 200,000 birds. One would expect that rational decision maker would be willing to pay much more to save 100 times more birds. Yet, the subjects were willing to pay approximately the same amount irrespective of the number of birds saved: $80 for 2,000 birds; $78 for 20,000 birds; $88 for 200,000 birds. 34 Attribute substitution explains that the subjects were not answering the questions they were asked, which would involve complex computations like the price of one bird multiplied by the total number, adjusted to its total population, scarcity, etc.
Instead, they substituted it for an easier question: how much they were willing to pay for a prototypical bird. That is why their evaluations were almost the same.
Contrary to formalistic ideals, reliance on experiential and intuitive decisionmaking also means that cognition is inseparable from emotion. 35 This is not necessarily bad. Not all emotional reactions are illegitimate or bad for judicial decision-making. Emotion can be a form of thought, compressed and inarticulate. 36 Sometimes, however, emotional states, especially a misattribution effect, can impair the quality of decision-making. 37 Yet, even when decision-making is characterized by System 2 processes, emotions are unavoidable. 38 Here once again the formalistic idea of judging as a cold, purely rational thinking process, 
EXPERT JUDGMENT AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
The interdisciplinary empirical research on decision-making has been blooming for at least a few decades now; however, most empirical studies on judgment and decision-making have been carried out with subjects other than judges. Thus, one can reasonably question whether general research on decisionmaking is applicable to judicial decision-making: while there is no doubt that judges are susceptible to many cognitive biases, there is still the possibility that their decision-making faculty is superior in some ways. 41 One possible reason is that judges undergo a specialized training -legal education. Schauer, for example, suggests that legal training, subsequent legal 40 Ibid., p. 109 ("The more experienced the judge, the more confidence he is apt to repose in his intuitive reactions and the less likely he is to be attracted to a systematic decision-making methodology, perhaps involving Bayes's theorem or other algorithms, decision trees, artificial intelligence, debiasing techniques, and so forth"). 41 experience, and finally the judging experience may produce significant differences between judges and ordinary people. Therefore, one possibility is that trained lawyers are expert decision-makers in their field and thus make better legal decisions. 42 Another hypothesis is that it is not legal training in general that makes judges better decision-makers, but the experience of judging itself. Hence, it is judges not as lawyers but judges as judges proper who have enhanced judgment and decision-making abilities. 43 Both hypotheses about expert decision-making seem plausible, however, as the following sections show, such hypotheses are largely unsubstantiated.
LAWYERS AS EXPERT DECISION-MAKERS
It would be only too natural to expect that specialized training, including legal education, enhances decision-making and problem-solving skills. The idea that specialized training is useful goes back to the ancient Greeks: Plato urged statesmen to study arithmetic because "even the dull, if they had an arithmetical training … always become much quicker than they would otherwise have been"; the medieval scholastics thought that study of logic, especially syllogisms, trains the mind. Yet, it seems that these researchers erroneously concluded from these findings that no formal discipline can improve reasoning and problem-solving skills. When it comes to law, however, the contemporary empirical research, although not extensive, shows that legal education does not improve reasoning and problem-solving skills, at least beyond negligible levels or outside conditional logic. This is mostly because law, as an academic discipline (but not as a real-world legal practice), resembles more deterministic science model -solving legal issues with logic, and preferably deduction, and almost no exposure to uncertainty and probabilistic issues.
One study examined the difference in reasoning skills between graduates of psychology, medicine, chemistry, and law. 49 As a control procedure, the study looked at verbal reasoning skills; the main focus was on statistical and methodological reasoning skills, where students had to apply their reasoning skills to both scientific and everyday-life problems. The study was designed both as cross-sectional and longitudinal. 50 Initially, there were no differences in test scores across the four disciplines. Two years of training in all disciplines had no substantial effect on verbal reasoning skills. After two years of training, however, psychology graduates showed a 70% increase in methodological and statistical reasoning; medical training produced a 25% improvement in test scores; legal training, like graduate training in chemistry, had no substantial effects. 50 Cross-sectional study compared first-year and third-year graduate students to one another. In longitudinal study first-year students were reasessed two years later to compare their later performance with the original. 51 Ibid. Overall, the studies suggest that legal training provides no such significant improvement in reasoning and problem-solving skills that some other disciplines 52 There are other major drawbacks of the case method. 59 For example, the facts presented in a judicial opinion may be biased to support the stated result. Also, the case method typically relies on appellate decisions; however, these decisions are usually the result of poor decision-making in lower courts, and so studying only appellate decision(s) may exclude models of sound decision making, i.e. cases that were not appealed.
Needless to mention, most law students who fail even primitive legal reasoning and problem-solving skills in law schools, are not appointed to the bench.
Yet, it would be equally naïve to expect that a lawyer becomes a judge only after he or she had developed superior decision-making and problem-solving skills. 56 Conditional logic is concerned with proof that follows from the assertion a conditional -essentially a proof that the antecedent necessarily leads to the consequent. Schematically, it is usually represented as follows: 1. A > B ("If A, then B") 2. B > C ("If B, then C"). 3. A (proof assumption -A is true) 4. B (modus ponens; -"If A then B; A, therefore B"). 5. C (modus ponens; "If B then C; B, therefore C").
In the study by Lehman and others, law students, like graduate students of psychology and chemistry, improved on all four types of conditional logic questions: arbitrary, causal wording, permission wording, and biconditional (Darrin R. Lehman, Richard O. Lempert, and Richard E. Nisbett, supra note 44: 431-442; p. 329). 57 Gilovich thus explains why training in psychology and similar social sciences yields superior reasoning ability: "Some of the material conflicts with students' pre-existing beliefs and thus provides much more than the usual incentive to engage in critical analysis, to suggest alternative explanations, and to consider the adequacy of both existing data and other potentially informative evidence. The student is thus encouraged to engage his or her analytic faculties with unusual intensity because the very nature of the material invites it. The complexity of the phenomena, the difficulty of untangling correlated variables, and the relative scarcity of truly decisive experiments compel all but the most disengaged students to dig deeper and think harder" (Thomas Gilovich, supra note 48, p. 192-193 63 The same pattern exists across the board.
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The so-called regular, high-validity environments are the exception. Such fields are regular enough to be predictable, and most importantly, experts in these fields learn these regularities through prolonged practice. 65 Predictability depends essentially on the quality and speed of feedback. Yet, there are relatively very few fields that could be characterized as high-validity environments.
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Judging, if anything, is a very low-validity environment. For one, if judges receive any feedback at all about the quality of their decisions, it is usually months after the decision is made-when the appellate court reviews the case. Most likely, however, judges do not receive any feedback at all, not to mention instant feedback required for improved expert performance. In this context, even the case method has some advantages over actual experience of judging: the case method usually provides a law student with immediate feedback about decision-making and legal reasoning quality.
Another reason that compounds the problem is that most judges are generalists, and thus any feedback, if it ever reaches them at all, is dispersed:
With the exception of the tasks judges perform repeatedly, it might take a long time for judges to accumulate enough feedback to avoid errors. It is as if a professional tennis player divided his time or her time among tennis, volleyball, softball, soccer, and golf rather than concentrating on tennis -the player's opportunity to develop "tennis intuition" would diminish. … Moreover, because the benefit of experiential learning in a wicked [low-validity] environment is limited, training may be necessary to compensate for deficiencies in the learning environment.
67
In general, the institutional system of courts 68 and the nature of judging means that judicial experience itself does not improve judicial decision-making significantly, and general empirical research on decision-making will usually apply with equal force to judicial decision-making.
CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the main lesson we can draw from the empirical research is not to overrate distinctiveness of judicial decision-making. The myth surrounding judicial dispute settlement is that judges, although otherwise ordinary people, rise above ordinary human reasoning capabilities once they sit on the bench, and thus are able to demonstrate almost supreme reasoning ability: to make cold, rational, purely logical decisions, which are devoid of intuitions, experiential thinking, and any emotions.
a chance to identify which general treatment approach is most suitable for different patients. The feedback they receive from their patients' long-term outcomes is sparse, delayed, or (usually) nonexistent, and in any case too ambiguous to support learning from experience" (Daniel Kahneman, supra note 8, p. 242). 67 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, supra note5: 39-40. 68 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich suggest one way to improve this aspect: "[J]urisdictions could adopt peer-review processes to provide judges with feedback. For example, every two years, three experienced judges from other jurisdictions could visit a target court. They could select a few cases recently decided by each target court judge, read all of the rulings and transcripts, and then provide the judges with feedback on their performance and constructive suggestions for improvement" (ibid.: 39).
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Yet, as the empirical research demonstrates, judges are no different from ordinary research subjects in their preference for automatic thinking over logical rule-based thinking, even when intuitive thinking might lead to systematic decision errors. While a rule-based thinking system is capable of overriding judgments of the automatic system, in practice it seldom does so; moreover, this rule-based system is easily depleted, and once depleted it defers to the intuitive system. Thus, judicial decision-making, like decision-making in general, is sensitive to numerous seemingly unimportant factors, even such trivial features as breakfast and lunch times.
This means that judges, like other people, will tend to make snap judgments even when incomplete information is available; these snap judgments will sometimes be based on logical thinking and sometimes not. They will also tend to substitute easier questions for more difficult ones. And all of this is only a small number of ways in which automatic, intuitive thinking system differs from the formalistic ideals of judicial decision-making. Yet again, it is important to note that System 1, by and large, will produce reasonable decisions most of the time.
In general, indirect empirical evidence also suggests that legal training or judicial experience does not develop superior expert judgment. One reason why judges perform no better than ordinary subjects is because judging is a low-validity environment -it provides no instant feedback about the quality of decisions made and thus judges do not improve their decision-making skills.
All of these findings, understandably, are very unpleasant to believers of rational judicial decision-making models. And the judicial establishment is not very likely to embrace the emerging discoveries from the empirical sciences because it threatens the institutional ethos. One reason, as Judge Posner points out, is "judges want to deny the role of subjectivity in judicial decision making" and they also want "to convince people they wear blinders to keep them from straying off the beaten path; that they are society's dray horses." 69 
